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Introduction1 
 
To commit wrong and to feel the bitter injustice of wrong-doing is part of the 
human predicament. The natural impulse is to pay back the injury in kind. But such 
retaliation implicates us in a cycle of resentment, retaliation and revenge. This sort of 
retaliation precludes reconciliation. As Michael Ignatieff points out, vengeance 
implicates us in the “vicious downward spiral of violence” and in the reinforcement of a 
“culture of violence.” All this may be done in the name of honour and respect.2 The law 
is one avenue to rectify such intrusions of wrong-doing.  But procedural justice can often 
be inadequate. In part, this is because while the law can be broken, literally speaking, 
only persons (moral agents) can be wronged. As Hannah Arendt reminds us, “The 
majesty of the law demands that we be equal—that only our acts count, and not the 
person who committed them. The act of forgiving, on the contrary takes the person into 
account; no pardon pardons murder or theft but only the murderer or the thief. We always 
forgive somebody, never something . . . we forgive for the sake of the person.”3 The 
inadequacy of the law is that, while it can offer justice, it is an inadequate mechanism to 
deal with the breached failed relationship that occurs because of the wrong. Forgiveness 
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offers the promise of reconciliation, or at least, the mending of the relationship rendered 
by the wrong. 
The ability to offer and receive forgiveness is a hallmark of our humanity. Yet, 
this valuable moral resource is both misunderstood and neglected. Forgiveness is a 
powerful third way between revenge and forgetting whereby we cope with an injury 
inflicted by one upon the other.   
 We argue for a particular conception of forgiveness with the following 
characteristics: forgiveness as transactional (primarily bi-lateral, rather than unilateral), 
elective (not obligatory) and conditional.  Initiating the process requires forgiveness to be 
extended to the wrongdoer but not at the expense of forgetting, excusing, or condoning 
the wrong. The offer of the apology shifts the control or power from the wrongdoer to the 
victim who may initiate the conditional decision which may culminate in the repairing of 
the damaged relationship. A wrong may not be simply a perpetration of harm, but also a 
moral insult. It is the insult, this loss of respect for the dignity and integrity of the other, 
that needs to be addressed by the apology.  The focus of this paper is on the role of 
apology; in particular, as it is offered by the perpetrator of the wrong and as it is received 
by victim who can, if she chooses, forgive.  
II: Profile of the Wrongdoer and the Process of Forgiveness 
A profound wrong is inflicted by one upon another. A victim (the sexually 
assaulted, the racially recriminated, the betrayed, the genocide survivor, etc.) is created. 
When a profound wrong has been perpetrated, the victim will invariably experience anger 
and resentment. This resentment may well be justified. Resentment in this sense can be 
thought of as moral outrage. Yet, retaliation implicates one in a spiral of revenge. It 
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repays injury with another injury.4 In genuine forgiveness, resentment is eliminated, or 
seriously ameliorated. The importance of forgiveness is that it can serve to undo the 
deeds of the past5, not literally but attitudinally.  It enables people to make a new start in 
their relations with one another. Forgiveness is the forswearing of justified resentment 
engendered by a moral assault and the infliction of a moral insult.6  
The role that forgiveness can play in our moral lives is formidable. Yet, it has too 
often been diminished. It has been dismissed as a superogatory act that stands at the 
periphery of moral obligation, i.e., a favour or gift bestowed by the victim. It has been 
denigrated as a form of amateur therapy, misconceived as a kind of forgetting (“time 
heals all wounds”); or a type of excuse (“to understand all is to forgive all”).  Forgiveness 
is best conceived as a transactional process offering the possibility of mending moral 
disruptions. It is an important that forgiveness is not a performative; saying is not the 
same as doing. The saying of the words “I forgive” does not make it come about.  
Forgiveness is not cheap since it requires overcoming, amending, and shifting attitudes, a 
process which is arduous and at times insurmountable. This overcoming is a form of 
second order existential commitment, a reassertion of sovereignty for one’s identity, and 
the reclamation of one’s personal narrative as a person of integrity and worth.  
Wrongdoers are significantly affected by forgiveness or its lack. Yet, little 
attention has been directed to “what wrongdoers themselves must do in the aftermath of 
their wrongful acts.”7 Yet, if forgiveness is to occur, the wrongdoer has to offer a genuine 
act of contrition – a sincere avowal of the wrongdoer’s culpability. Two presumptions, 
while contestable, are warranted although not defended here: first, we adopt the position 
that forgiveness is a discretionary judgment; it is an elective, though not mandatory, 
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prerogative of the victim. Some accounts of forgiveness argue there are instances where 
offering forgiveness is obligatory.8 We think this account is mistaken since it 
misconstrues the sense of voluntary agency if one is required to forgive.9  Second, while 
forgiveness can be considered a uni-lateral decision by the victim to forgive, we adopt bi-
lateral forgiveness as paradigmatic since it preserves and makes explicit two perspectives, 
of victim and wrongdoer. Forgiveness may be self-directed but it is usually other-
directed. It is another person who is the target of this moral and affective relation. 
Conceived as a bi-lateral transactional process from the perspective of the perpetrator, 
forgiveness occurs when one person injures another, atones, begs forgiveness, and it is 
granted.  Radzik claims that “to right a wrong is to restore the social imbalance, to bring 
the relationship or the community back into harmony.”10 This harmonization requires that 
both parties affected by the offence achieve parity. Put differently, the power differential 
which is knocked off kilter by the offence is restored, both at an interpersonal and 
communal level.11 
 The process of forgiving has a dialectical structure with three moments: One, a 
wrong or injury is perpetrated by one person against another. Two, the onus is on the 
injurer to offer restitution or an apology which acknowledges responsibility for the moral 
insult, express (tacitly or explicitly) remorse, offer assurance about future conduct, and 
entreat the victim for forgiveness. Three, the victim forgives the perpetrator; the original 
act is neither cancelled nor nullified but repaired to facilitate a possible reconciliation.  
 In order for the forgiver to be in a position to carry through the act of forgiveness, 
she must undergo a number of cognitive and attitudinal shifts: 
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An emotional shift: the affective overcoming of negative feelings– be they anger, 
resentment, or even moral hate towards the perpetrator. In releasing these 
negative feelings, the victim need not renounce her belief that a wrong was 
perpetrated against her; she neither condones nor excuses the act. 
 
A temporal shift: the temporal placing of the wrong in the past so that the future 
will not be preoccupied or remain burdened by it.  Govier asserts that one must 
“let past wrongs remain in the past, freeing one’s present and future from a 
troubled preoccupation with the past.”12  
A structural shift: a reframing of the situation in which the perpetrator is 
separated from the wrong; a prising apart of the sinner from the sin, so to speak. 
One way of doing this is to isolate the offending deed from the totality of the 
perpetrator’s biography. 
A narrative shift: an act of self-renewal, in which the victim transcends the event 
by not letting the event stunt or define both victim and perpetrator. The victim 
regains control over her life.  Since our biographies are both lived and told, the 
significance we ascribe to our actions is open to reinterpretation so we can 
reinvent our past to provide a transformative life-story or narrative.13  
A cathartic shift: the releasing of a moral claim against the perpetrator; the moral 
debt is discharged; the resentment is purged. 
Reconciliation—the rebuilding or repairing of the broken relationship – between 
victim and perpetrator is conspicuously absent from the above. While we agree with 
Roberts that the goal or “teleology of forgiveness is reconciliation,”14 it is a mistake to 
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hold that if reconciliation does not take place, then forgiveness has not occurred. The 
parents of a murdered child may come to forgive the murderer, release their anger and 
resentment for the arbitrary and abrupt removal of their child from their lives, but it 
makes no sense to say that their forgiveness is incomplete if they choose not to build and 
conduct a relationship with the murderer. To forgive is to mend what has been torn. 
While reconciliation is an aspiration, often a rewarding realisable possibility, it is not a 
necessary component for forgiveness. 
Granting forgiveness, the offence is not forgotten or condoned. Rather it will be 
remembered in a way that is compatible with peaceful co-existence. It is a coming to 
terms with the past so the future can be lived unfettered by resentment. Forgiving is 
typically not a uni-lateral judgment. One must have good reasons to forgive, and, usually 
the wrongdoer has a critical part to play in the construction of these good reasons. The 
wrongdoer has to acknowledge atonement. 
III: Apology, Atonement and the Role of Acknowledgement 
Atonement on the part of the perpetrator is an important step in the process of 
forgiveness functioning both as an expression of sorrow for the wrongdoing and as an 
initiative towards reconciliation. Following Radzik, the process of atonement is “a matter 
of reconciling the parties to one another and to themselves as equally valuable moral 
persons”15 and is what “the wrongdoer must do in order to respond in a morally proper 
way to her wrongful act.”16 Atonement often involves both apology and 
acknowledgement. Acknowledgment opens the possibility of atonement for the wrong, 
giving voice in the apology. Failure to atone for one’s wrongdoing often compounds the 
original wrong and could negate the apology. 
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Atonement is making moral amends. As Radzik argues, through the infliction of 
the wrong, the perpetrator is denigrating the victim as a person of little or no moral worth. 
An apology leaves this message of moral worthlessness unsaid. It is considered an 
attempt to cancel this insulting, humiliating message that can end the anger and 
resentment of the victim. “To wrong another person is to insult and threaten him. To do 
nothing (or to fail to do enough) to correct that action is to allow the insult and threat to 
stand. It is to condone their continued influence. When one fails to atone, one suggests 
that one still views the victim as inferior and that one remains a threat to him.”17 
An apology is not a soliloquy. It occurs when the offender acknowledges 
responsibility for an injury or grievance and expresses regret and remorse to the 
aggrieved.18 No apology is successful without communication between offender and 
victim. As Tavuchis notes, the apology “cannot be delegated, consigned, exacted, or 
assumed by the principals, no less outsiders, without totally altering its meaning and 
vitiating its moral force.”19 By recapitulating the wrong and seeking forgiveness, the 
apologiser voluntarily adopts a posture of vulnerability, openness, honesty and accedes to 
the victim(s) the power to accept, refuse or ignore the apology and in turn to forgive or 
refuse to forgive. In a sincere apology, the apologiser voluntarily declares he has no 
excuse (mitigating or exculpatory), justification, or explanation for his transgression and 
accepts full responsibility. 
The authentic apology is a speech act seeking atonement by acknowledging 
responsibility and guilt. The wrongdoer acknowledges inflicting injury and harm, 
acknowledges the restoration of the moral dignity of the undeserving, ill-treated victim(s) 
that was unfairly and unjustly ignored, and acknowledges the legitimacy of resentment 
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harboured by the wronged.20 When he has successfully atoned for his transgression, he 
gives his victim good reasons to stop harbouring resentment. The apology is directed at 
the victim, not solely to the act. One type of insincere apology occurs when what is 
apologized for is the wrong, but no apology is addressed to the victim of the wrong. For 
example, “I am sorry that that you were offended by my action, which I admit, was ill-
advised.” Apologies are a powerful way to acknowledge responsibility and guilt, and to 
express other-oriented moral regret. Yet, as Govier and Verwoerd write, “Much more 
needs to be said about acknowledgement, which is a greatly underexplored concept. An 
account of why acknowledgement is important to human beings may be grounded in 
theories about the social construction of identities, roles, and values.”21  
              Acknowledgment is to bear witness, to attest. An apology contains within itself a 
two- tiered structure of acknowledgement. One sense of the term “acknowledgment” is 
descriptive. I accept that I was the material cause for the harm and I now feel remorse for 
harming you. Moreover, I appreciate the meaning of my role in the context of the harm. 
But there is a second sort of acknowledgement, a second order, existential aspect that 
involves the vocabulary of such terms as responsibility, ownership, and commitment. It is 
only with the accomplishment of this second order directive that one can be said to be 
taking charge of one’s life and of one’s self transformation. Here is the insight to the 
transformation that is necessary to atonement.  The descriptive response requires an 
acceptance of the act, a deeper understanding of one’s role and behaviour. The existential 
response is to take personal and moral responsibility for oneself as a member of a moral 
community by an act of attestation. This commitment is a will to will oneself fully 
responsible through the existential act of personal acknowledgement. Acts of 
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acknowledgement infuse moral significance; they situate the victim, perpetrator and 
wrong within a moral horizon.  
 There are, of course, reasons why someone might fail to forgive despite the offer 
of an apology. For example, the act of forgiving might make the victim feel enfeebled 
rather than empowered. In such a situation, forgiveness would simply exacerbate victim 
humiliation since it would admit that the perpetrator continues to hold  undeserved 
power, authority, or strength. But one may also refuse to forgive if the offence is of such 
a nature as to be completely and absolutely unforgivable. 
 There are indeed some acts that are unforgivable, like the atrocities committed on the 
serial killer Robert Pickton’s farm--acts so horrendous “that they transcend the realm of 
human affairs and the potentialities of human power, both of which they radically destroy 
wherever they make their appearance.”22 Nevertheless since the perpetrators are 
autonomous moral agents with the capacity for reflection and transformation, no person 
is absolutely unforgivable. By distinguishing between agent and deed and between 
absolute and conditional forgiveness, “[we] may rightly regard a perpetrator as 
conditionally unforgivable if that perpetrator has not acknowledged, and does not morally 
regret, the wrongdoing.”23 If the perpetrator remains wedded to the unforgivability of the 
act and has not convincingly separated himself from the deed, then there may be good 
reasons to hold him conditionally unforgivable.24 The lack, or inadequacy, of the apology 
is sufficient to deem him an unworthy recipient of forgiveness. 
The apology can meet certain needs of the victim. It can contribute to the 
restoration of her self-worth and dignity, re-establish her self-respect, provide assurance 
to the victim that fault does not lie with her, provide assurance that both parties have 
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shared values and can co-exist in the moral community as co-equals, confirm that the 
insult has been “unsaid” but is now recognized and given voice, and establish that the 
sense of threat is replaced by that of safety. Through the apology, the perpetrator allows 
for the possibility of a meaningful dialogue that may repair the damaged relationship 
between victim and wrongdoer and the relationship between the wrongdoer and 
community. 
IV: A Consideration of Two Apologies 
What then must the perpetrator do if he is to be a recipient of forgiveness? A 
precondition is a sufficient period of time for self-reflection and self-appraisal. If 
atonement is to be achieved, the following are steps to be taken to render continued 
resentment and anger inappropriate: 
A. There is, initially, a cognitive acknowledgement of responsibility for having 
perpetrated the wrong. The perpetrator who does not own up to the wrong would 
feel no need to be forgiven. If he did not do anything wrong, then he would not 
feel guilty and any attempt to forgive would be felt to be misplaced. By accepting 
his guilt, he may wish to unburden himself of it. The example of Speer and 
Spitzer’s apologies will be considered below in response to this condition. 
B. There is an authentic emotional feeling of remorse. This involves recognition of 
guilt that will saddle the perpetrator with negative feelings such as shame and 
remorse. This feeling of remorse can find expression through the sense of moral 
regret which is the acknowledgment of responsibility. This guilt is not self-
negating, all consuming, but the trigger for a positive change in the perpetrator.  
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C. There is repudiation in deed and word of oneself as the wrongdoer, a commitment 
to become the sort of person that will refrain from such deeds. Repentance alone, 
however, is insufficient since it is often a unilateral act. To vow not to act in such 
a way again does nothing to repair the social rupture that the wrong has wrought 
unless it is followed by a sincere commitment to change.25  
D. There is a genuine narrative accounting for how one came to do the wrong, how 
the wrong-doing does not express the totality of one’s biography, and how one 
has changed for the better. The Eric Lomax case will be employed later to track 
this consideration. 
E. The expression or reaffirmation that both the wrongdoer and the victim are 
members of the moral community with the attendant dignity and moral worthiness 
that such membership entails. The apology is a testament by the wrongdoer of the 
salience of moral norms since it is an admission of a violation of these norms. As 
Deigh maintains, “social cohesion in a community depends on its members 
sharing an understanding of what each owes the others, both individually and 
collectively, in the way of forbearances and positive services.”26 
 When a comprehensive apology is wholeheartedly delivered, and received as such 
by the wronged person, the initiative to forgive is placed on the shoulders of the victim. 
However, the apology can also be inadequate. A necessary component of any apology is 
that it must restore the sense of worth, dignity, personal power or authority of the 
offended party. There are disavowals that fail to be apologies. Here are three types of 
diversions. 
 191 
First, an apology is not an explanation. An explanation helps us to understand 
how something occurred--the cause and effect relationship between the antecedents to the 
act and the act itself. But this does not tell us morally why something was done or what 
values are involved in the process of intention to act or of the consequences, intended or 
otherwise, that subsequently occur. For example, the police may explain why they failed 
to apprehend the serial murderer before he committed his last murder, given all the 
evidence that was available to them, but this account is not a justification and not the 
basis for an apology.  
Second, an apology is not an excuse. An excuse is an attempt to provide an 
account of what happened as happening beyond the agent’s control; it is the attempt to 
exculpate the agent responsibility while recognising the action as wrong. While in a 
mitigating excuse the responsibility is partially lifted, in an exculpatory excuse the 
agent’s responsibility is fully eliminated. But if the agent is not responsible, it is hard to 
see what she is being forgiven for. For example, when a mining company executive is 
caught bribing a corrupt industry minister in a foreign country, the claim that such 
practices are accepted in “their country” is an excuse in a failed attempt to justify a 
wrong. In this case, an excuse masquerades as a justification but fails to provide adequate 
ethical grounds to accept the account. It is an attempt to gain ethically unjustified-- 
perhaps expediency-based--acceptance for a wrong. Third, an apology is not a statement 
of regret since it does not link remorse with contrition. One can regret errors of omission 
or mistakes of understanding without acknowledging that one should have done things 
differently. This is to regret that the world could have been otherwise and the conditions 
for the wrongful choice might not have occurred, but such personal remorse is not an 
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apology. Instead it focuses on the self-serving feelings of the perpetrator and not the 
victim. Unlike an excuse, an explanation, or a statement of regret, an apology minimally 
involves recognizing, acknowledging, and taking personal responsibility for the act and 
trying to repair the damage done by it. Here are some initial criteria for detecting a 
genuine apology: 
 
1. It is sincere, authentic or self-authored by the person giving the apology. The mother 
apologizing for the actions of her grown son, without the express permission of the son, 
may be an example of an insincere apology by proxy.   
2. There is an adequate acknowledge of wrongdoing in which the offender accounts for 
his actions with an appropriate degree of specificity. Someone making the sweeping 
claim to apologize to anyone he may have offended in the past in his role as 
administrator, may be woefully inadequate. Not only is such a sweeping claim vague but 
it is also inadequate because its generalization fails to identify specifics.  
3. There is an acceptance of blame. Specifically he makes clear why his actions were     
wrong and identifies the principles he violated. Often someone will apologize but still not 
accept blame for what he has done. For example, the individual may apologize for 
participating in the process of the mistreatment of others but shift the blame to what is 
called “situational control”, i.e., one’s prescribed role in that situation and duties 
attendant in the context. The community exerts such social control that it is deemed 
impossible to escape it and so one is not responsible for the subsequent actions that 
conform to this control. This is a form of relativism that seems to obscure the individual’s 
responsibility for his part in a situation. Many of the defendants at the Nuremberg trial 
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took this stance. Their plea was “not guilty” on the basis of the fact that they were just 
doing what they were told – what the law at the time promoted – in a kind of transference 
to the other away from the individual’s responsibility to the individual’s situation.  
4. There is adequate evidence that a transformative process has already begun--that there 
is evidence of a commitment to change ethical character and disposition. Such evidence, 
Deigh suggests, may be evinced by the development of a “conscience, which both works 
to restrain him from yielding to those narrow interests, emotions, and impulses that, if 
acted on, would harm others, and moves him to reparative action when he has violated 
one of its strictures and consequently damaged or risked damaging harmonious relations 
he has with others.”27 
The Lomax Case: A Successful Apology  
A prisoner of war during World War II, Eric Lomax, in his memoir28, writes of 
being consumed by hatred and vengeance until he received an apology nearly fifty years 
later and was able to forgive his torturer tormenter. His account is that of a man trying to 
make sense of his experiences. He was suspected of spying and subjected to brutal 
interrogation and torture, caged in a cell, land left exposed in the sun for extended periods 
of time. His torturer and interpreter was a brutal man who became the focus of his hatred. 
Though constantly threatened with death, he was eventually sent to a Singapore prison. 
Upon his return to Scotland, his life had been dramatically altered by his experiences in 
Burma as he suffered emotional withdrawal and was prone to icy rages and silent 
hostility. He frequently fantasized about the revenge he would exact from the interpreter. 
He read about a Japanese translator wracked with forty years of guilt for inflicting cruelty 
on POWs. The translator mentioned his inability to forget a victim tortured for drawing 
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and hiding a map. Lomax recognised Nagase Takashi, his torturer. The article described 
Takashi’s repentance and his attempts at atonement which included setting up a 
charitable foundation for survivors of the Asian labourers, the laying of wreaths at the 
Allied cemetery, and his frequent trips to Thailand to build a temple at the bridge over the 
River Kwai. Later Lomax read about the shame that Takashi felt while watching Lomax 
being beaten. Takashi, now a Buddhist, wrote of being forgiven after praying at a 
cemetery for Allied soldiers. Lomax met Takashi, noting that Takashi’s remorse was 
acute. Takashi said his life had been profoundly altered because of the War and he was 
now opposed to militarism. The two met and Lomax gave Takashi a letter of forgiveness. 
Since we are interested in the phenomenon of apology from the perspective of the 
perpetrator, our interest is more on the torturer Takashi than Lomax the prisoner. With 
this focus, the following significant steps were taken by Takashi to demonstrate an 
attempted atonement: 
 He wrote a short book reflecting upon his experiences ((A): a cognitive 
acknowledgement) 
 He felt guilt and remorse (B) 
 He worked with the War Graves Commission and revisited the graves (C) 
 He built a religious shrine at one end of the bridge over the River Kwai (E) 
 He adopted an anti-militarist position (C) 
 When contacted by Lomax’s wife and informed of her husband’s anguish, he 
acknowledged who he was and responded with a thoughtful, sincere letter (E) 
 When the two met, Takashi kept repeating “I am very, very sorry.” (B) 
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      Takashi gave Lomax enough good reasons to demonstrate that he had atoned for 
his transgressions and that it was time to mend the rupture. Takashi’s response to the 
wrongs that he had committed is significantly different from that provided by other 
offenders, like Governor Eliot Spitzer so it will be useful to contrast these two examples. 
 
 
 
 
The Spitzer Case: A Failed Apology  
In March 2008, Elliot Spitzer, the Governor of New York, stepped down from his 
office because he had been implicated for patronising high priced prostitutes. He offered 
what was supposed to be an apology. It was painfully inadequate but instructive.  
First, he did not come clean. No details of his wrongdoings were revealed; he 
evaded rather than acknowledged responsibility (A).  He began his public address with an 
account of his accomplishments as State Governor General and Attorney General which, 
in fallacious Red Herring fashion, diverted attention away from the wrong and his part in 
it.  
Second, his framing of his resignation as a private, personal failing or private 
matter seemed calculated to remove it from public scrutiny. He spun the prostitution-
related offence as an affair and not a crime; hence he focused on the hurt to his family, 
not his failed relationship with the society that elected him. It seemed contrived, an 
attempt to negotiate himself into a position to avoid criminal charges. There was no 
evidence of contrition, no semblance of emotional feeling or remorse. He stood steadfast 
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and resolute. While Spitzer used emotional modifiers in his brief televised statement, 
such as he felt “deeply sorry” and “sincerely apologized,” both his body language of 
detachment and his wife’s body language of disbelief seemed to open these statements to 
serious doubt.  
Third, his statements contained no repudiation of himself as the wrongdoer (C). 
His avowal that he had “disappointed himself” did nothing to inform his audience as to 
what moral values he had violated. This was a statement of regret for the consequences 
he would suffer, not a genuine apology intended to change relationships.   
Fourth, he provided no narrative accounting, in which he situated himself as the 
main actor,  for how he came to do the wrong (D) or how he intended to change because 
of it. There was little attempt to provide a cogent self-narrative explaining motive or 
context; the audience was afforded no insight into his character or the nature of his 
offences.  
Fifth, there was little attempt to reaffirm his membership in and relational 
commitment to the moral community (E). He did affirm that he would attempt “to regain 
the trust of his family and friends” but the offences were clearly more egregious and he 
said nothing about the damage to the moral community or how he would address or 
rectify them. 
V: Conclusion 
When a wrong occurs, there is a need for a moral transaction to be negotiated, a 
damaged relationship to be repaired and a resolution made to rectify the wrong. Human 
beings are finite and incomplete and so is the public realm in which we act. Relationships 
that are fractured by a wrong cannot await a judicial decision or the expectation of a 
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correction of the fault in another world. Both the victim and the perpetrator need to have 
good reasons to work toward a resolution of a wrong. The acknowledgement of one’s 
culpability in a wrong reveals an important insight about forgiveness – that we are 
fallible, limited beings. As Berel Lang claims, “the acknowledgement of a wrong 
committed and the assurance he [the wrongdoer] offers against its recurrence also 
represent a confession of limitation: he has not only suffered finitude, he has also asserted 
it, an acknowledgement that represents a stronger form of self-knowledge.”29  
Forgiveness by the victim opens the door to acknowledgement, to atonement for 
the wrong by the perpetrator, often in the form of an apology, and, finally, in the 
completion of the process, to the possibility of reconciliation. This transformation of the 
perpetrator and the victim in their relationship to each other is essential to achieving the 
recognition that can benefit both the perpetrator and the victim, abandoning 
recrimination, resentment, and hatred, and thereby freeing both parties.  
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Murphy and Hampton point out that wrongs possess an expressive power; a symbolic 
meaning. To wrong a person is to insult them, to demean them. “All wrongs seem to be 
insults, but some forms of insult are much more harmful than others” (Pamela 
Hieronymi, “Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness,” Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 62.3 (May 2001): 142). 
7 Linda Radzik, “Making Amends,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 41 (2004): 141. 
8 J. Wilson, “Why Forgiveness Requires Repentance,” Philosophy 63 (1988): 534-535. 
9 William A. Meninger, The Process of Forgiveness (New York: Continuum International 
Pub., 1997) 
10 Linda Radzik, Making Amends, 145. 
11 John Deigh, “Empathy and Universalizability,” Ethics 105.4 (1995): 11. “For social 
cohesion in a community depends on its members sharing an understanding of what each 
owes the others, both individually and collectively in the way of forbearances and 
positive services.”  
12 Trudy Govier, Forgiveness and Revenge, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 100. 
13 Cf. Brian Fay’s distinction between a lived life and a told life:  “Stories are lived 
because human activity is inherently narratival in character and form; in acting we knit 
the past and the future together” (Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science (London: 
Wiley-Blackwells, 1996), 206). 
14 Robert C. Roberts, “Forgiveness,” American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1995): 290. 
15 Radzik, Making Amends, 148. 
16 Radzik, Making Amends, 141 
17 Radzik, Making Amends, 142. 
18 Govier, Forgiveness and Revenge, 125. 
19 Nicholas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 1991). 
20 The apology may include some of the following: an explanation of the offence, an 
expression of shame, an acceptance of guilt, the intention to not commit the offence 
again, and reparations to the aggrieved party. While we have advanced a secular account 
of apology, it is worth keeping in mind that in religious circles, the notion of repentance 
often plays the role that we have ascribed to the apology.  For example, Maimonides 
offers the following steps towards repentance: confession, humility, remorse, 
forbearance, and reparation, which mirror the steps of the apology. 
21 Trudy Govier and Wilhem Verwoerd, “The Promise and Pitfalls of Apology,” Journal 
of Social Philosophy, 33.1 (Spring, 2002): 81. 
22 Hanna Arendt, The Human Condition, 241. 
23 Govier, Forgiveness and Revenge, 117. 
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24 Govier, Forgiveness and Revenge, 59: “No moral agent is ever absolutely 
unforgivable, though many may be, for important reasons, conditionally unforgivable.” 
25 See: Marcel Lieberman, Commitment, Value and Moral Realism (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1998), 85, where he argues that the “constitutive role of commitment in 
self-understanding and identity….” is most important to character development. Deigh 
argues that “one can express sorrow and regret, offer explanations, ask forgiveness, and 
make apologies and further amends. By these actions, one disowns, as it were, one’s 
transgression, seeks to regain the trust one has lost, and signals a desire to renew good 
relations” (John Deigh, The Sources of Moral Agency: Essays in Moral Psychology and 
Freudian Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996), 9). 
26 Deigh, The Sources of Moral Agency, 11. Also, see Murphy, “Forgiveness and 
Resentment,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 7 (1982): 503-516. 
27  Deigh, The Sources of Moral Agency, 11.  
28 Eric Lomax, The Railway Man: A True Story of War, Remembrance, and Forgiveness 
(New York:Random House, 1995). 
29 Berel Lang, “Forgiveness,” American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1994): 115. 
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